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COMMENTARY
LAW AND PHRENOLOGY
Pierre Schlag*
As the intellectual credentials of American law become increasingly dubious, the ques-
tion arises: how has this discipline been intellectually organized to sustain belief among
its academic practitioners? This Commentary explores the nineteenth-century pseudo-sci-
ence of phrenology as a way of gaining insight into the intellectual organization of Ameri-
can law. Although there are, obviously, significant differences, the parallels are at once
striking and edifying. Both phrenology and law emerged as disciplinary knowledges
through attempts to cast them in the form of sciences. In both cases, the "sciences" were
aesthetically organized around a fundamental ontology of reifications and animisms -
'Yaculties" in the case of phrenology, "doctrines" and "principles" in the case of law.
Both disciplines developed into extremely intricate productions of self-referential complex-
ity. In both cases, the disciplinary edifice was maintained by disciplinary thinkers who
sought confirming evidence of the truth (and value) of their enterprise and who went to
great lengths to avoid disconfirming evidence. Finally, the suface plausibility of both
disciplines was maintained through a tacit reliance on folk beliefs (folk-frames and folk-
ontologies) that were recast in professionalized jargons. Both the similarities and the
differences between phrenology and law lead to a fundamental question: does the disci-
pline of law know anything, and if so, what?
Let us dismiss prejudice, and calmly listen to evidence and reason; . . .
let us inquire, examine, and decide. These, I trust, are the sentiments of
the reader; and on the faith of their being so, I shall proceed... to state
very briefly the principles . ... 1
In 1840, phrenology was a confident science, promising clear and
certain knowledge concerning the mental attributes and behaviors of
human beings. It was a time of exhilarating new possibilities, of dis-
coveries compounding discoveries. There were conferences and sym-
posia. There were professional associations. There were lengthy
learned tomes and scholarly journals. The first issue of the American
Phrenological Journal had just appeared in October of 1838.2 And
when George Combe, the renowned phrenologist, came to deliver his
lectures in New Haven in February and March of 1840, he drew a
large crowd. The audience, "for numbers and respectability, [was]
such as rarely falls to the lot of a public lecturer in [that] city."3 It
seemed as if the new discipline would go on forever.
* Nicholas Rosenbaum Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I wish to
thank the friends and colleagues who have commented on prior drafts.
1 ... of Phrenology itself." GEORGE COMBE, A SYSTEM OF PHRENOLOGY 6 (Boston, March,
Capen, Lyon & Webb 1839).
2 See I AM. PHRENOLOGICAL J. 1 (1838).
3 Mr. Combe's Lectures at New Haven, Ct., 2 AM. PHRENOLOGICAL J. 372, 372 (x840) (quot-
ing NEW HAVEN REc., Mar. 21, 1840).
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This discipline of phrenology was devoted to the identification of
basic brain functions and their manifestations in cranial features. The
basic principles and framework were established by Dr. Franz Joseph
Gall.4 By sifting through an impressive array of empirical data, Gall
sought to uncover the fundamental affective, moral, and intellectual
faculties of human beings. He believed that the identification of these
faculties - everything from "Benevolence" to "Individuality" to "Cau-
sality" - enabled the classification of various human types and behav-
iors, and provided a fundamental explanation of human behavior.
Although Gall was principally interested in establishing a scientific
explanation for human behavior, many found his phrenological ac-
count immensely useful in predicting human behavior. Gall's discov-
eries soon found practical applications in such varied contexts as
criminology, the treatment of mental illness, moral and intellectual ed-
ucation, and all manner of business.,5 Nelson Sizer, a renowned Amer-
ican phrenologist, even suggested that phrenology could enable a
lawyer to "learn to read the dispositions and talents of his jury, or the
witnesses in a case."6 In early nineteenth-century America, phrenology
showed considerable promise as a tool for what is now called social
engineering. Success seemed near.
But, it was not to be. By most current accounts, phrenology has
not fared well. Before we examine the pathways of its decline, how-
ever, it behooves us to try to understand what was at stake. This is
not to say that we should adopt "the internal perspective." There can
be no question here of trying to make the materials of phrenology the
best they can be. But something might be learned by trying to under-
stand how the phrenologists went wrong.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHRENOLOGY
Gall, the acknowledged founder of phrenology, was born on March
9, 1758.7 He was a handsome man with a pleasant countenance and a
broad "noble head."" Indeed, the towering forehead seems to have
been a characteristic feature of a good number of important phrenolo-
gists, including J.C. Spurzheim, George Combe, and Charles
Caldwell.9
Gall wished to transform the study of brain functions, then called
psychology, into a science.' 0 Above all, Gall believed that he had to
4 See COMBE, supra note i, at 44; Edwin Clarke, Gall, Franz Joseph, in 6 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 47, 47-48 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
5 See Utility of Phrenology, I AM. PHRENOLOGICAL J. 144, 146 (1839).
6 NELSON SIZER, FORTY YEARS IN PHRENOLOGY 395 (New York, Fowler & Wells Co. 1888).
7 See id. at 381.
8 Id. at 38o-8i.
9 See id. at 379-84.
10 See ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
16 (iggo).
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rescue this nascent field from the conjectures and constructions of
metaphysicians and speculative philosophers. As Gall saw it, the phi-
losophers' categories - sensation, attention, comparison, reasoning,
desire, and so on - might prove helpful to the philosophical project
of understanding the mind, but they were quite useless in explaining
differences among species, and among individuals within the human
species.'1 Gall believed that a taxonomy of a completely different or-
der was required. He stated:
We need faculties, the different distribution of which shall determine the
different species of animals, and their different proportions of which ex-
plain the difference in individuals. All bodies have weight, all have ex-
tension, all are impenetrable in a philosophical sense; but all bodies are
not gold or copper, such a plant, or such an animal. Of what use to a
naturalist the abstract and general notions of weight, extent, impenetra-
bility? By confining ourselves to these abstractions, we should always
remain in ignorance of all branches of physics, and natural history.
This is precisely what has happened to the philosophers with their
generalities. From the most ancient to the most modern, they have not
made a step farther, one than another, in the exact knowledge of the true
nature of man, of his inclinations and talents, of the source and motive
of his determinations. Hence, there are as many philosophies as pre-
tended philosophers; hence, that vacillation, that uncertainty in our insti-
tutions, especially in education and criminal legislation. 12
Gall thus set out to identify the fundamental faculties through sci-
entific observation of data. He jettisoned the philosophers' specula-
tions and abandoned the proverbial philosopher's armchair in favor of
a naturalist methodology. He meticulously examined animal behavior,
"family life, schools, the jails and asylums, medical cases, the press,
men of genius, and the biographies of great or notorious men.' 3
Gall's empirical investigations were guided by what came to be
known as the cerebral localization hypothesis.14 The key notion un-
derlying this hypothesis was a correlation between function and locale:
as Gall saw it, the brain is subdivided into various cortical organs that
each serve as the unique locale for certain functions. According to this
hypothesis, various parts of the brain are dedicated to certain innate
functions - the various moral, affective, and intellectual faculties.
Gall supported the cerebral localization hypothesis with analogical ar-
guments: given that nature has created particular apparatus for seeing,
hearing, salivating, and so on, "why should she have made an excep-
11 See id. at iS.
12 1 FRANCOIS JOSEPH GALL, ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN AND OF EACH OF ITS
PARTS 88-89 (Winslow Lewis, Jr. trans., Boston, Marsh, Capen & Lyon 1835); see also 6 id. at
246-47 (asserting that Gall was exploring "fundamental qualities" themselves, while others con-
fined themselves to exploring only the attributes common to these qualities).
13 YOUNG, supra note io, at ig.
14 See id. at 23-24.
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tion in the brain? Why should she not have destined this part, so
curiously contrived, for particular functions?"'s
In developing this theory of cerebral localization, Gall was inspired
by his repeated observations of an apparent correlation between an
individual's particular behavioral tendencies and his cranial features.
As a child, and later as a university student, Gall observed that those
who learn by heart with great facility have "large prominent eyes."' 6
Gall's repeated observation of such correlations between behavior and
cranial features gradually solidified into a firm conviction: "I recalled
my early observations, and immediately suspected, what I was not
long in reducing to certainty, that the difference in the form of heads
is occasioned by the difference in the form of the brains." 7 The spe-
cific explanation that Gall gave for the correlation was that the preva-
lence of a particular faculty in an individual was reflected in the size
of the organ in the individual's brain which, in turn, was manifested
in the size and appearance of that person's cranium.' 8 The existence
of a particularly developed faculty in an individual (or an animal)
would thus correspond to certain cranial prominences.
This conviction provided a scientific basis for testing the existence
of Gall's fundamental faculties. Through cranioscopic examination,
Gall could test for the presence of a particular propensity or faculty.
Indeed, the ability to correlate cranial features to the presence of fun-
damental attitudes or behaviors allowed for an independent confirma-
tion of the presence (or absence) of an innate faculty. All together,
Gall identified twenty-seven fundamental faculties that, in isolation or
in combination, could serve to explain human behavior.
Gall's method was very much in keeping with early nineteenth-
century science. His method provided an empirical basis for distin-
guishing between attitudes and behaviors linked to specific innate fac-
ulties and those traceable either to combinations of faculties or to
exogenous or accidental influences. Through scientific observation of
countless samples, Gall sought to induce the identities of the funda-
mental human faculties as well as their tell-tale manifestations. He
also used the accumulated data to confirm the existence of the
faculties.
This approach was a kind of "reflective equilibrium" avant la lettre
in which the principles of phrenology - namely, the faculties -
would be tailored to empirical observation and judgment while empiri-
cal observation and judgment would be guided by the phrenological
15 2 GALL, supra note 12, at 99-ioo; see also Phrenology: Its Origin and Early History, with a
Consideration of Some of the More Common Objections to It, I Am. PHRENOLOGICAL J. 33, 37
(1838) C'We mean... not that the brain is the mind, but that it is the organ or instrument of the
mind's operations.,).
16 1 GALL, supra note 12, at 58.
17 Id. at 59.
18 See YOUNG, supra note io, at 38.
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framework. Observation and correlation served to connect the crucial
parameters of Gall's taxonomy: striking behavior, fundamental faculty,
cortical organ, and cranial prominence.
Gall's framework has been helpfully schematized as follows: 19
STRIKING implies - > FACULTY implies - > CORTICAL < - implies CRANIAL
BEHAVIOR < - causes (innate < - causes ORGAN causes - > FEATURE
(talent, instinct) (activity (size varies
propensity, varies with with
mania) size) underlying
organ)
Once the fundamental faculties were identified and defined, Gall
and the other phrenologists were able to deploy them to explain
human behavior. As an example, consider the faculty known as "Ac-
quisitiveness," or what Spurzheim identified as "Covetiveness."20 This
faculty, ostensibly situated at "the anterior inferior angle of the parie-
tal bone," produces a general tendency to acquire.21 Acquisitiveness is
a largely formal faculty: it acquires its specific content or particular
direction from the other faculties with which it is combined. In a col-
lector of objects of natural history, for example, Acquisitiveness is
combined with Individuality. "[[]n a collector of old coins, Acquisi-
tiveness and Veneration are large."22
Viewed in isolation, the faculty of Acquisitiveness may seem vulgar
and selfish, as Combe conceded. Yet as he pointed out, Acquisitive-
ness is absolutely crucial to the development of civilization:
In the faculty of Acquisitiveness . . . the Phrenologist perceives an in-
stinct prompting the human being, after his appetites of hunger and
thirst are appeased, and his person protected against the elements of
heaven, to labor from the mere delight of accumulating; and to the cease-
less industry which this instinct produces, is to be ascribed the wealth
with which civilized man is every where surrounded. It prompts the
husbandman, the artisan, the manufacturer, the merchant, to activity in
their several vocations; and, instead of being necessarily the parent only
of a miserable and degraded appetite, it is one of the sources, when
properly directed, of the comforts and elegances of life.2 3
Of course, it is also true that when "the pursuit of wealth becomes the
business of life, Acquisitiveness, usurps the place of the moral senti-
ments, perverts the intellect, and becomes the source of the greatest
evils." 24 Thus, like many faculties, Acquisitiveness has both a negative
and a positive side.
As an objection to the faculty of Acquisitiveness, the phrenologists
faced a familiar, indeed recurrent argument. Critics argued that the
fundamental faculty of Acquisitiveness was neither fundamental nor a
19 This schema is taken from YOUNG, cited above in note io, at 36.
20 See COMBE, supra note i, at 191.
21 Id.
22 Id. at '97.
23 Id. at 196.
24 Id.
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faculty, but rather a derivative abstraction traceable to what we
would now call the process of socialization. 25 The social institution of
property itself, critics argued, promotes the tendency to Acquisitive-
ness. The short answer, for phrenologists, was that this argument had
things exactly backwards. According to the phrenologists, the very
idea of property springs from the faculty of Acquisitiveness. Indeed,
"the laws of society are the consequences, and not the causes, of its
existence."26
One of the most striking aspects of phrenology was its detailed
character. Because phrenologists were quite astute in understanding
the relations among categories within their taxonomic framework,
phrenology developed into an intricate multi-layered field. From the
very beginning, Gall recognized that one of the most difficult tasks in
his method was to determine "which classes of behavior represented
fundamental faculties" and which represented a combination or aggre-
gation of fundamental faculties.27 Such a subtle and difficult problem
required a sophisticated understanding of how to correctly individuate
the fundamental units of the system.28
Gall's solution was to attempt to find extreme manifestations of the
ostensible faculty and to ascertain whether they varied independently
of other known faculties. If they did, then the ostensible faculty was
truly fundamental. In this way, Gall could distinguish spurious facul-
ties and combinations of faculties from the true animating agencies of
the system - the fundamental faculties:
Amativeness
Philoprogenitiveness
Adhesiveness
Combativeness
Destructiveness
Secretiveness
Acquisitiveness
Self-Esteem
Love of Approbation
Cautiousness
Eventuality [and Individuality]
Locality
Form
Vocabulary
Language
Coloring
Mne
Number
Constructiveness
25 See id. at I97.
26 Id. at 198.
27 YOUNG, supra note io, at 35.
28 See id.
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Comparison
Causality
Wit
Ideality
Benevolence
Imitation
Veneration
Firmness29
Once phrenologists identified the fundamental faculties, they
turned to refining, relating, and reconciling the various categories of
phrenology. This work constituted the bulk of phrenological research
and scholarship. The discipline evolved through a kind of internal
elaboration; through careful craftsmanship, the phrenologists sought to
refine their own categories to produce a framework at once elegant
and practicable. They expended tremendous effort to the proper defi-
nition and elaboration of faculties, as well as to the elimination of
spurious faculties. Similarly, they spent great effort ascertaining how
best to relate the various definitions of the fundamental faculties to
various observable behaviors or attitudes in human beings.
The vast bulk of this work of categorical construction, refinement,
and harmonization consisted of careful case analysis. Combe's rejec-
tion of "Perception" as a distinct faculty provides a good example.
Through case analysis, Combe sought to demonstrate that what others
called "Perception" was actually a mode of action of a number of intel-
lectual faculties.30 He compared the case of Milne, who had an acute
perception of form though he could not perceive some colors, with
other cases involving persons who could perceive visual symmetry but
could not recognize melody.3 ' For Combe, these were all cases of indi-
viduals who "possess[ed] acute powers of perception as to one class of
objects," but still were "quite unable to perceive others."3 2 Combe de-
duced that if perception were a fundamental faculty, then it would not
be selective in this way concerning its objects. Accordingly, perception
could not be a fundamental faculty, but was instead "a mode of action
of the faculties which form ideas."33 For Combe, then, perception
might be called a quality of other fundamental faculties. It was this
kind of careful sifting through cases that enabled the identification of
the fundamental units of phrenological analysis.
The discipline of phrenology involved not only a complex horizon-
tal differentiation, but also an intricate vertical organization, one that
was sensitive to the various levels of abstraction. The aesthetic preci-
29 For Gall's discussion, see 3 GALL, cited above in note 12, at 141-316, and 4 GALL, cited
above in note 12, at 1-247.
30 See COMBE, supra note i, at 468.
31 See id. at 469.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 468.
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sion and the methodological clarity of the phrenological taxonomies
are evident in Combe's account of Spurzheim's work:
Dr. Spurzheim divides the faculties into two orders, FEELINGS and
INTELLECT, or into affective and intellectual faculties. The feelings are
subdivided into two genera, PROPENSITIS and SENTIMENTS. He applies
the name propensities to indicate internal impulses, which invite only to
certain actions; and Sentiments designate other feelings, not limited to
inclination alone, but which have an emotion of a peculiar kind superad-
ded. Acquisitiveness, for example, is a mere impulse to acquire; Venera-
tion gives a tendency to worship, accompanied with a particular emotion,
which latter quality is the reason of its being denominated a Sentiment.
The second order of faculties makes us acquainted with objects
which exist, their qualities and relations; and they are called intellectual.
They are subdivided by Dr. Spurzheim into four genera. The first in-
cludes.the external senses and voluntary motion; the second, those inter-
nal powers which perceive existence; or make man and animals
acquainted with external objects, and their physical qualities; and the
third, the powers which perceive the relations of external objects. These
three genera are named perceptive faculties.3 4
Phrenology, of course, did not always display such precision and
careful craftsmanship. Indeed, phrenology, like other disciplines, had
its share of crude mechanistic thinking. In phrenology, such thinking
continuously sought, in a reductive fashion, to produce highly simplis-
tic linear linkages between faculties and behaviors.
The mechanistic tendency was particularly prevalent in the later
attempts to produce comprehensive restatements of phrenology. Many
of these summaries were well intentioned - designed to reduce confu-
sion and complexity. Nonetheless, many were deeply flawed - insuf-
ficiently sensitive to the qualities of mind necessary to a true
discipline. These later efforts were bent upon a kind of summarization
of the science of phrenology through propositional restatement. These
efforts had an instrumental goal - to make phrenology more practi-
cally useful and to defend phrenology from critics' claims of internal
contradiction. Here, then is one such attempt to restate the fundamen-
tal doctrines of phrenology:
In the early study of Phrenology, the cranial subdivisions were sup-
posed to be very minute and therefore complicated. It was owing to the
attempt to locate the district of all the traits that serious contradiction
developed throughout the entire reasoning.
The old charts made by pioneer students, such as Spurzheim and
Gall, that later met further development by Broussais, Combe and
others, were given over due consideration and accepted as practically
standard theories, by later students; much to the sacrifice of the construc-
tive building of the science.
Many traits are found to exist in the same districts, running relatively
or homogeneously throughout given areas; thereby, making it impossible,
34 Id. at iOs.
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in some cases, to set aside any minute point, or location on the brain that
directly bears upon a single trait.
To avoid this erroneous and complicated method of phrenologic rea-
soning, the Humanology chart is designed as a more generalized system
of divisional analysis; readily perceivable and fundamentally correct.
The ... enumerated districts are sufficient to designate all important
brain centers and functions; also to form a basis for the study of Phrenol-
ogy. The traits of a district are pronounced only when the district is full
and prominent, otherwise the functions are weak and adverse.35
Apart from these lapses into crude mechanistic accounts, phrenol-
ogy proceeded cautiously through careful internal self-development.
As a result of this incremental process, phrenological knowledge be-
came at once extremely nuanced and quite voluminous.
This is not to say that critics did not raise many objections to
phrenology. One objection was that the validity of its findings invari-
ably depended upon the ability to measure the various organs -
something that could not be easily achieved. Hence, it was suggested
that the breadth of the organs could not be ascertained because "the
boundaries of them are not sufficiently determinate. "36
The answer to this point was straightforward. As suggested by one
eminent phrenologist, "although the boundaries of the different organs
cannot be determined with mathematical precision, . . . yet, in a single
case, an accurate observer may make a very near approximation to the
truth."37 The phrenologists argued that the various boundaries of the
organs could very well be defined with sufficient precision "for all
practical purposes."3
Critics also suggested that the boundaries of the organs were
"purely ideal" - not rooted in the thing itself. The phrenologists' re-
sponse was again straightforward: the critics' argument goes too far to
be sensible. In order to accept the anti-phrenologists' arguments, one
"must be prepared to maintain, that the boundaries of a hill or hillock
are purely ideal, and depend in every instance on the fancy of the
measurer."39 As the phrenologists saw the matter, this was, of course,
a proposition too absurd to be admitted. They argued that, at least
for practical purposes, it was quite possible to develop a uniform sys-
tem for the comparison of organ sizes. Combe suggested using the fol-
lowing categories to denote the relative gradations in organ size:40
3S JOHN BRYCE ADAms, TEXT BOOK OF HUMANOLOGY: THE COMPLETE SCIENCE OF
HUMAN-ANALYsis 31-32 (1922).
36 COMBE, supra note I, at 82 (emphasis added).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 88.
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Very small Moderate Rather large
Small Rather full Large
Rather small Full Very Large
A refinement of this scale was suggested by another phrenologist,
Captain Ross, who advocated the use of an explicitly quantitative
scale - one that would allow greater differentiation and thus greater
precision:4 1
1. 8. Rather small 15.
2. Idiocy 9. I6. Rather large
3- io. Moderate 17.
4. Very small ix. i8. Large
5- 12. Rather full '9.
6. Small 13. 20. Very large
7- 14. Full
In Captain Ross's twenty-point scale, every other number was
identified by name. The intermediate figures served to "denote inter-
mediate degrees of size, for which," as Combe put it, "we have no
names." 42 The advantage of Captain Ross's scale was, as he saw
things, considerable: because the values of the variables at the extreme
(Idiocy to Very large) could be known, the values toward the middle of
the scale could be derived in a relative manner.4 3
II. The Critique of Phrenology
Despite all of these conceptual refinements, despite the cautious
case analysis, and despite its sundry practical applications, phrenology
failed to live up to its ambitions. The simple explanation is that Gall
and the other phrenologists had their ontology wrong. The fundamen-
tal faculties (as such) did not exist. They were not linked to the size of
cranial organs. Further, the cranial organs did not bear any relation
to cranial prominences. For all of their detailed inquiries, their sorting
of countless cases, and their remarkable attempts to synthesize their
research into fundamental faculties, principles, or laws, the phrenolo-
gists failed.
The interesting question is how was this failure occasioned? What
precisely enabled the phrenologists to fail in such a spectacular way?
Put another way, the question is how did the phrenologists manage to
sustain their failure for the better part of a century? The question
deserves close inquiry because phrenology was not just any kind of
disciplinary failure.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id.
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It was a grand failure that attracted countless adherents - includ-
ing some very intelligent men. It was a failure that sustained profes-
sional associations, symposia, treatises, and journals. The
phrenologists assembled an elaborate structure of detailed information
and thus, phrenology became a kind of expert domain. The question
arises, what enabled all of this detailed expertise to flourish, even
though its fundamental ontology and its grounding structure were
deeply flawed?
The question is particularly salient because some of the phrenolo-
gists were quite sincere in their ambition to establish a genuine science
- one informed by careful empirical observation of cases. Unlike
their predecessors, the speculative philosophers and the metaphysi-
cians, the phrenologists were committed to and did indeed perform
countless case studies and case analyses. Given such sustained en-
counters with empirical data - the real world of human comportment
- how did phrenologists fail to recognize that their own hypotheses,
their own methodological presuppositions, were not true? After in-
specting so many craniums, how did they fail to realize that the crani-
oscopic hypothesis was wrong?
These questions are of interest not only for those who seek to un-
derstand the evolution of phrenology, but also for those who seek to
understand the development of other expert disciplines. The answers
have much to do with the ways in which the phrenological paradigm
was constructed. It was an amalgamation of animisms and reifica-
tions; of self-referential complexity, of self-legitimations and folk be-
liefs. The internal organization of phrenology gave its practitioners
what they wanted most: the belief that they knew something and that
this something was useful - even good. It also gave them an elabo-
rate construct that could be deployed to deny conflicting evidence and
to counter opposition - without dealing seriously with either.
A. Animism and Reification
In the context of nineteenth-century thought, Gall's phrenological
taxonomy enjoyed certain intellectual advantages over the taxonomies
of other fields. Gall's predecessors, such as Locke, had devised catego-
ries of mind in order to show that the mind was adapted to reaching
true inductions. In attempting to vindicate the adaptation of mind to
true understanding, Locke and the other philosophers necessarily in-
troduced a normative element into their analysis and their taxonomies.
Indeed, the classificatory schemes of the metaphysical philosophers
were aimed at understanding the idealized operations of the mind in
performing its idealized epistemological operations - namely, the pro-
duction of true inductions. 4 4
44 See YOUNG, supra note io, at i-ig.
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Gall, by contrast, sought to avoid these idealizing tendencies, favor-
ing a more functionalist approach instead. His interest was not in
grounding certain correct epistemic operations of mind, but rather in
understanding how the mind actually functioned. This meant two
things. First, it meant dropping the normative orientation: the thing
to be explained was not correct operations of mind, but operations of
mind as these actually occurred (whether correct or not). Second, his
work explained not simply the knowing or understanding mind, but
more broadly, the interacting and behaving mind.45 Indeed, as one
commentator put it, "Gall's position on this issue is in some respects a
striking anticipation of the adaptational or functional view of psychol-
ogy which was developed half a century later in the wake of the the-
ory of evolution." 46
But for all his functional orientation, Gall's explanatory categories
lapsed back into a faculty explanation, with all of its attendant circu-
larities.47 How did Gall explain certain behavior such as aggression?
There was a faculty for aggression. How did Gall explain a facility
for language? There was a faculty for language. How did Gall ex-
plain altruistic behavior? There was a faculty for benevolence.
The structure of this kind of explanation is simple. Behaviors are
classified into descriptive categories. The descriptive categories are hy-
postatized and projected back onto an agency, a potentiality, or a
faculty whose defining character is its ostensible capacity to produce
the behavior in question. The agency, potentiality, or faculty is then
offered as an explanatory cause of the behavior.48
The core problem with this kind of explanation lies in the unthink-
ing transformation of classifications designed to describe behavior (for
instance, aggression) into effective ontological agencies (the Destruc-
tiveness faculty). There is thus a kind of unthought and unexamined
transposition from epistemic heuristics to ontological actualities. Such
transposition is a generalized ontologizing effect of language and of
rhetoric. The ontological actualities produced by this transposition
have nothing going for them except the generalized ontologizing effects
of language and our failure to notice these effects.
The transposition from descriptive classification to ontological ac-
tuality occurs readily - indeed, almost automatically. Such a transpo-
sition is occasioned by three concurrent conflations. The epistemic
classifications are erroneously transubstantiated into robust ontological
entities that are part of the world to be explained. As the epistemic
classifications are transubstantiated into robust ontological entities,
they are typically reified: they become determinate object-forms with
stabilized identities. And in the transition from epistemic classification
45 See id. at 17.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 21-22.
48 See id. at 22.
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to ontological agency, they are endowed with animistic properties.
They become capable of producing behaviors, actions, and the like.
Such repeated conflation is precisely what happens in Gall's expla-
nations of brain functions. His explanations are reminiscent of Mo-
liere's physician who, when asked to explain how opium induces sleep,
answers that opium has a dormitive principle.49
B. Self-Referential Complexity
When a faculty explanation takes hold, all sorts of entities are pos-
ited into existence. These entities become the fundamental units of
analysis. In phrenology, the fundamental units of analysis were none
other than the fundamental faculties: these became the tacit ontologi-
cal forms through which brain functioning and human behavior were
explained.50
It is precisely because the fundamental ontological entities were im-
aginary that all manner of complex relations could be established
among them. Because the units of analysis lacked any robust or stabi-
lized referent, virtually anything could be said about how they were
related to each other.
Without any stabilized referent for the fundamental faculties, phre-
nologists could produce a great deal of complexity, including numerous
interpretations and applications of the fundamental faculties. They
could perform classic analytical operations, such as specification, sub-
division, and entailment, in an endless array of combinations without
much risk of running into serious resistance from their putative object
of study. The predictable result was a great deal of complexity. In-
deed, as the Fowlers put it:
If the students of law and medicine must study constantly some ten
years before they can be admitted to practise, what amount of prepara-
tion - of both original talent and of acquired knowledge, are required
to fit one for the practice of a science far more complex and extensive
than both law and medicine united? - a science embracing within its
vast range all the ever-varying emotions and mental manifestations of
the human mind - all the never-ending phenomena of thought, feeling,
opinion, and conduct appertaining to man! Let any one undertake to
calculate, arithmetically, the number of changes that can be rung on the
thirty-seven faculties in all their different degrees of development, and he
will find them to be inconceivably great .... 51
This production of internal complexity helped sustain belief. In-
deed, the internal complexity of a discipline often contributes to main-
taining belief among its practitioners. Practitioners become so focused
49 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 18-i9 (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
Vintage Books 1966); YOUNG, supra note io, at 22.
SO See YOUNG, supra note io, at 2-3.
SI O.S. FOWLER & L.N. FOWLER, PHRENOLOGY PROVED, ILLUSTRATED, AND APPLIED 417-18
(New York, O.S. & L.N. Fowler, ioth ed. 1842) (emphasis added).
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on the intricacies of minute disciplinary issues and problems that their
attention is diverted from any recognition that the entities and the dis-
cipline are a kind of collective imaginary. Friedrich Nietzsche made
this point succinctly with respect to Kant:
But let us reflect; it is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judg-
ments a priori possible?" Kant asked himself - and what really is his
answer? "By virtue of afaculty" - but unfortunately not in five words,
but so circumstantially, venerably, and with such a display of German
profundity and curlicues that people simply failed to note the comical
niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer. People were actually
beside themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation
reached its climax when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man
- for at that time the Germans were still moral and not yet addicted to
Realpolitik.
A time came when people scratched their heads, and they still
scratch them today. One had been dreaming, and first and foremost -
old Kant. "By virtue of a faculty" - he had said, or at least meant. But
is that - an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repe-
tition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? "By virtue of a
faculty," namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Molire
52
Nietzsche's observation obviously has broader applications. Generally,
the existence of internal complexity within a discipline imparts to its
practitioners a kind of confidence in the discipline itself and a corre-
sponding inability to engage in critical questioning of its root ontology
and methodological operations. The internal complexity and internal
differentiation of a discipline are experienced as a confirmation of the
profundity and accuracy of its truths. Among phrenologists, this inter-
nal complexity prevented them from recognizing their flawed method-
ological assumptions as well as the error of their shared and mistaken
belief in an imaginary ontology.
Given the commitment of phrenologists to careful examination of
empirical data, it nonethless remains interesting that their numerous
case studies did not shake them out of their mistaken ontology. In-
deed, given their examination of thousands upon thousands of human
skulls, it is striking that these empirical observations did not lead the
phrenologists to abandon their entire taxonomy as well as the flawed
cranioscopic hypothesis.,53 Part of the answer to this puzzle is that
Gall and the phrenologists, despite their professed commitment to sci-
entific examination of the empirical data, wanted to believe.
C. The Legitimation of Phrenology
Although many phrenologists were not serious scientists, but rather
hacks or charlatans, this was manifestly not true of Gall and other
52 NIETZSCHE, supra note 49, at i8-i9.
53 See YOUNG, supra note io, at 38.
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eminent phrenologists. The question thus is: how could someone like
Gall, who was committed to serious investigation of data, be taken in
by such a flawed ontology and such mistaken theories? Part of the
answer is that Gall was not even-handed with his own methodological
commitments. Although he professed the need for careful and impar-
tial examination of nature, in deploying this methodology he sought
confirmation of his hypotheses. Gall would adduce evidence tending
to support the existence of a relation between behavior, cortical organ,
and cranioscopic configuration. But Gall had no fixed criteria, no
standard, no threshold at all, for deciding what constituted supporting
evidence.54
By contrast, if evidence seemed to falsify the crucial phrenological
hypotheses, Gall and the other phrenologists almost invariably sought
to explain away the data. Hence, when Gall encountered a case in-
volving large, projecting eyes (supposedly a sign of intelligence and
good memory) coupled with a rather unremarkable memory, he ex-
plained that the large eyes were probably due to rickets or
hydrocephalus.55 Similarly, when it was reported that Descartes' skull
was remarkably small in the anterior and superior regions of the fore-
head (where the cortical organ for rationality was ostensibly located),
Spurzheim explained this away by noting that Descartes was not
nearly so great a thinker as previously supposed.5 6
Phrenologists thus employed a shifting burden of proof: data tend-
ing to confirm the veracity of phrenology were accepted immediately
as evidence and treated as true, while anomalies, falsifying data, and
critical commentary were treated as presumptively false and rejected.
The phrenologists interpreted evidence from a vantage that presumed
that they were already in possession of secure and certain knowledge.
For them, the burden was on the critics and the unbelievers to demon-
strate the contrary:
If the functions of the brain had been already ascertained by some
method of inquiry of a more satisfactory nature than that resorted to by
Dr. Gall, we might have argued, with some fairness, that if his observa-
tions were inconsistent with those already obtained, they could not possi-
bly be true. But when it is notorious that all other methods of
investigation have failed to unfold the mystery of the cerebral functions,
it is as obvious as the noonday sun, that no information which we may
possess can enable us to decide, a priori, and without any examination of
the evidence, that his mode of inquiry is fallacious and its results
untrue.5
7
In one sense this defensive orientation is characteristic of any profes-
sional discipline that, by definition, understands itself to be already
54 See id. at 40-41.
SS See id. at 43.
S6 See id.; Phrenology in France, 82 BLACKWOOD'S EDINBURGH MAG. 665, 671-72 (1857).
57 On the Merits of Phrenology, 2 AM. PHRENOLOGICAL J. 433, 437 (184o).
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possessed of certain knowledge and methods.5 8 But all professional
disciplines are not defensive or closed in all the same ways. The de-
fensive posture of the phrenologists was particularly pronounced.
In the later stages of phrenology, any distinction between phreno-
logical knowledge and its advertisements for itself collapsed. Phrenol-
ogy became a discourse of self-celebration. The ironic result was that,
as phrenological knowledge became increasingly stressed and less cred-
ible, the normative claims about its usefulness and moral worth be-
came increasingly inflated and more grandiose.5 9
The phrenologists thus insulated themselves and their discipline
from any productive confrontation with criticism. Phrenology's re-
search program, in effect, became little more than a reiteration of its
own internal architecture, its own self-same truths. To the extent that
it survived, it did so for exactly the same reasons that it failed: the
field and its practitioners were insulated from criticism by the phrenol-
ogists' desire to believe. They wanted to believe. And thus, they disre-
garded whatever threatened their beliefs.
D. Folks and Phrenology: The Production of Belief
One thing that made phrenology possible was its close tie to folk
beliefs. From the perspective of folk beliefs, the cerebral localization
hypothesis, the cranioscopic hypothesis, and Gall's twenty-seven fun-
damental faculties seemed perfectly sensible.
The cerebral localization hypothesis tracked a folk frame linking
function and locale. In all manner of folk beliefs about the body,
housing, religion, architecture, work, and the like, there is a meto-
nymic link between function and locale. The phrenologists and their
contemporaries could thus easily believe that various locales of the
brain were linked to different functions. In Gall's phrenological work,
this belief drew support from an explicit analogy to other bodily or-
gans.60 Inasmuch as bodily organs (the stomach, the liver, the kid-
neys) are dedicated to certain bodily functions, it seemed reasonable to
suppose that the same principle might apply within an organ (specifi-
cally, the brain). This incompletely theorized analogy helped yield the
cerebral localization hypothesis.
The phrenologist's cranioscopic hypothesis likewise tracked folk be-
liefs. The cranioscopic hypothesis holds that the size of a cortical or-
gan is correlated to its power. The bigger the organ, the greater its
power. The plausibility of this supposition stemmed from a perceived
correlation between magnitude and capacity. The idea of a link be-
tween the two is a folk frame that is instantiated in all manner of folk
58 See STANLEY FIsH, Anti-Professionalism, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 215,
244-46 (1989).
59 See generally SIZER, supra note 6, at 394-95 (extolling the virtues and usefulness of
phrenology).
60 See 2 GALL, supra note 12, at 99-Ioo.
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beliefs about physics, biology, sexuality, war, and so on. One need
only add the reasonable supposition that cranial size reflects the mag-
nitude of the various cortical organs, and phrenology's cranioscopic
hypothesis becomes eminently believable.
Furthermore, in its description of the fundamental faculties, phre-
nology incorporated various folk beliefs about human 'character and
temperament. The faculties identified by Gall were already cotermi-
nous with character traits identifiable throughout Western culture. Be-
nevolence, acquisitiveness, amativeness, combativeness - these were
all character traits well known and easily recognized among the popu-
lace. What Gall identified as faculties, folk belief described variously
as temperament (such as bilious or lymphatic) or as character (such as
greedy or aggressive). Phrenology's ontology of fundamental faculties
thus tracked and tapped into a pre-existing folk ontology of tempera-
ment and character. Phrenology reconstructed a folk ontology already
in force into a mildly more scientific jargon. Indeed, "the quintessence
of phrenology's appeal was . . . in its ability to shelter and legitimize
existing beliefs by recasting them in a scientific mould."61
Thus, by replicating a folk ontology in a slightly more professional-
ized jargon, phrenology was able to draw upon pre-existing folk beliefs
while nonetheless representing its knowledge as scientific and rooted in
actual scientific empirical investigation. This double aspect - (i) the
tracking of a folk ontology, (2) in a jargon seemingly independent of
that folk ontology - gave phrenology its considerable rhetorical
power.
In addition, phrenologists often made their "science" track popular
moral and political beliefs. Much phrenological work was explicitly
racist, ascribing inferior physiological capacities to non-white races.6 2
Moreover, case diagnoses performed with phrenological terminology
tended to coincide and blend with specific folk beliefs. For instance,
one phrenologist's diagnostic analysis of Chief Justice Marshall found
that his head was "remarkable for its fine proportions." 63 Chief Justice
Marshall's head displayed "a strong preponderance" of the "higher sen-
timents and higher intellect."64 The organs of Comparison, Causality,
Individuality, Benevolence, Reverence, Firmness, Conscientiousness,
and Ideality were "noticeably large," while the organs of Self-esteem
and Love of Approbation were "but moderate."6 5 The phrenologist
61 R.J. Cooter, Phrenology and British Alienists, c.x825-i845: Part II: Doctrine and Practice,
20 MED. HIST. 135, r38 (1976), quoted in THOMAS HARDY LEAHEY & GRACE EvANs LEAHEY,
PSYCHOLOGY'S OCCULT DOUBLES: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF PSEUDOSCIENCE 92
(1983).
62 See JAMES P. BROWNE, PHRENOLOGY AND ITS APPLICATION TO EDUCATION, INSANITY,
AND PRISON DISCIPLINE at xxxdv-xxxv (New York, Scribners, Welford & Co. 1869).
63 Character of Chief Justice Marshall, I AM. PHRENOLOGICAL . 382, 383 (1839).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 383-84.
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then concluded on a celebratory note, weaving folk beliefs about Chief
Justice Marshall with phrenological truth:
We will now see how admirably his organisation was fitted, not only
to constitute a great judge, but such a judge as he is known to have
been.
* . . With an intellectual region so large and well balanced, Judge
Marshall had little difficulty in acquiring all the knowledge necessary to
the formation of judgment .... But intellect alone is not sufficient to
constitute the judge. The feelings should all be active, but should act in
harmony. There should be a large organ of Conscientiousness. This is
but the organ of a blind feeling, but it acts as a power in giving a strong
desire to discover the truth - and the whole truth - and in exciting the
intellect to greater effort when in search of truth. This, we have re-
marked, was a very large organ in the head of Judge Marshall.... His
organs of Reverence and Benevolence being large, these, connected with
his moderate Self-esteem, rendered him a most patient listener.66
Finally, the plausibility of phrenology was supported by the accom-
plishments and instrumental gains that it promised. Phrenologists
promised that their science would be useful in the day-to-day affairs of
men. Particularly in its later days, serious scientists abandoned phre-
nology, and practical entrepreneurs joined the phrenological enterprise.
The switch in orientation from the pursuit of science to the rendition
of instrumental services was well captured by Sizer, who wrote in
1882, "Fifty years ago people asked: 'Is Phrenology true?' Now they
ask, in regard to its uses, 'Does it benefit mankind?"' 67 Phrenology
promised to accomplish what few other forms of learning could de-
liver. Phrenology promised men nothing less than control over their
lives:
Before phrenology was known, the wisest of men had no means of decid-
ing, with anything like certainty, the talents or character of a stranger;
and hopeful mothers looked upon their darlings as so many angelic
blanks, each likely to realize her fondest expectations. Now phrenology
tells her how to guide the wayward and encourage the timid, and thus
reach desired results .... There is ten times more in men and women
than they realize, and their relation to business and effort could be won-
derfully improved if they knew their just powers and weaknesses; and in
like manner the moral and social happiness might be greatly enhanced.68
Phrenology promised both order and progress. As one commentator
put it, "[riegularity yet change, order yet progress - this was the ser-
vice of the organismic metaphor celebrated by phrenology."69
On the side of order, phrenology claimed that certain organic laws
governed the development and behavior of mankind and that the se-
cret to human fulfillment and happiness lay in knowing and observing
66 Id. at 384-85.
67 SIZER, supra note 6, at io.
68 Id. at 395.
69 ROGER COOTER, THE CULTURAL MEANING OF POPULAR SCIENCE 112 (1984).
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those laws. In an era in which religious beliefs were rapidly eroding,
phrenology promised to restore order and meaning to the universe.70
On the side of progress, phrenology championed "the regeneration of
the individual." 71 Phrenologists invoked lessons about their faculties to
promote middle class morality and Victorian virtue. Combe's treatise
preached temperance, cleanliness, regular habits, individualism, and
property rights and warned against spicy foods, living by stagnant wa-
ters, insubordination, and absenteeism.7 2 He cautioned his readers
about the overdevelopment of the faculties. On the one hand, exces-
sive philoprogenetiveness would result in "pampering and spoiling
children. '73 On the other hand, excessive amativeness would yield "in-
numerable evils" and render individuals unfit for the clergy (where
chastity is a requirement).7 4
Particularly in its later days, phrenology sustained itself not so
much by advancing the acquisition of knowledge or understanding
(that simply was not happening), but rather by demonstrating that its
existing body of knowledge was useful to social and individual
achievement. But even as early as 1839 the American Phrenological
Journal devoted an entire serial article to illustrating the utility of
phrenology, its truth being simply assumed: "we believe that - Phre-
nology is useful, because it is true. With the premises we have laid
down, this proposition requires not proof but illustration. As we have
said, we take for granted its truth. It is therefore useful."75
In these ways, phrenology came to be closely associated with folk
culture - with the practical day-to-day hopes and needs of men and
women. "It became popular because of its novel familiarity."76 In its
later days, belief in phrenology was promoted not so much by demon-
strating the validity of its fundamental ontology and fundamental
principles, but rather by highlighting its usefulness - that is, its abil-
ity to advance individual achievement and to promote the social good.
I. LAW
Despite the obvious differences between the rhetorical, intellectual,
and social organization of phrenology and American law, there are
some striking similarities. We will attend to the similarities first, and
then explore the differences.
Phrenology and law both emerged as disciplinary knowledges
through attempts to cast them in the form of sciences. Both "sciences"
were aesthetically organized around a fundamental ontology of reifica-
70 See LEAHEY & LEAHEY, supra note 61, at Ioo.
71 Id. at 95.
72 See COOTER, supra note 69, at 121.
73 COMBE, supra note z, at iS.
74 Id. at 113.
7S Utility of Phrenology, supra note 5, at 144, 146.
76 LEAHEY & LEAHEY, supra note 61, at rog.
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tions and animisms - "faculties" in the case of phrenology, "doctrines"
and "principles" in the case of law. Each discipline developed into an
extremely intricate production of self-referential complexity. In both
cases the disciplinary edifice was maintained by practitioners who
sought confirming evidence of the truth (and later the normative
value) of the disciplinary enterprise and who went to great lengths to
avoid disconfirming evidence and disenchanting encounters. In law in
particular, the legitimation of the enterprise has been understood to be
an essential aspect of the enterprise itself. Finally, the surface plausi-
bility of both enterprises - phrenology and law - was maintained
through tacit dependence on folk beliefs (folk-frames and folk-ontolo-
gies) that were re-cast in a professionalized jargon.
A. Law as Science
Much of the systematization of the discipline of American law oc-
curred in the late nineteenth century when the training of lawyers was
transformed from guild apprenticeship to professional university edu-
cation. Much of the conceptual groundwork for this transformation is
typically attributed to Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first Dean
of the Harvard Law School.77 Langdell stands in much the same rela-
tion to the discipline of American law as Gall stands to phrenology.
Both played a crucial part in establishing their respective disciplines
as sciences. Both served a critical role in defining the fundamental
ontological units of their respective sciences - faculties in the case of
Gall's phrenology and doctrines and principles in the case of Lang-
dell's law. Moreover, both had enduring influences on the internal
aesthetic of their respective disciplines.
Although Gall and the phrenologists were never able to secure a
place for phrenology in the university, Langdell and his brethren en-
joyed remarkable success. But the going was not easy. To firmly en-
sconce law within the university, it was necessary to establish its
intellectual credentials. Not only did universities have to be convinced
that law was somehow an appropriate and reputable discipline worthy
of study in its own right, but the profession of lawyers and judges also
had to be convinced that university training in law was helpful and
necessary for practice.
In the early i8oos, law was often viewed not so much as a disci-
pline, but as a kind of handicraft.78 Although a few law schools had
been in existence for many years, most legal training was still accom-
plished through apprenticeships.7 9 To the extent that law was essen-
77 See HARVARD LAW ScH. ASSN, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL 1817-1917, at 26-27 (i9,S).
78 It had not always been so. In Europe, law was one of the pillars of the medieval univer-
sity. See David S. Clark, The Medieval Origins of Modern Legal Education: Between Church and
State, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 700-01 (x987).
79 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 318-22 (2d ed. 198s).
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tially a kind of craft, it was not at all apparent why universities
should engage in its teaching or study. As Christopher Columbus
Langdell put it, "[i]f law be not a science, a university will best consult
its own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a
species of handicraft, and may best be learned by serving an appren-
ticeship to one who practises it."so
Langdell, of course, strongly supported the vision of law as science.
Indeed, he had been brought to the law school by a chemist, President
Eliot of Harvard University, who was already prepared to embrace
this conception of law."' When Langdell and his followers conceptual-
ized law as a science, they thought of science in its nineteenth-century
sense: science as rational ordering based on observation.8 2 Onto this
traditional nineteenth-century sense of science, legal thinkers grafted a
nascent twentieth-century sense of science as empirical method. Lang-
dell was explicit in analogizing law to the natural sciences. He con-
ceived of judicial opinions as specimens ready for observation or
dissection:
We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the proper
workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all that the
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all that
the museum of natural history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical
garden is to the botanists.83
In 1892, William Keener, Dean of Columbia College of Law, put it
this way:
Under this system the student is taught to look upon law as a science
consisting of a body of principles to be found in the adjudged cases, the
cases being to him what the specimen is to the mineralogist. It should be
remembered that the student is not simply given the specimen and asked
to find out as best he can what it is, but each specimen is accompanied
by an elaborate explanation and classification.
8 4
Langdell was so convinced that law was a science - not a craft -
that, in what has now become an entrenched and pervasive practice,
he favored hiring young teachers who had little or no experience in the
practice of law. Indeed, when Langdell retired from his deanship in
1895, three of the eight faculty members, namely Ames, Beale, and
Williston, had joined the faculty as young men with little experience in
practice.8 5
80 A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE Two
HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 85 (1887)
[hereinafter HARVARD COMMEMORATION].
81 See id. at 97-98.
82 See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION 29-30, 55-70 (1994).
83 HARVARD COMMEMORATION, supra note 80, at 86-87.
84 Methods of Legal Education, i YALE L.J. 139, 144-45 (1892) (section by William A.
Keener).
85 See ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD i90 (1967).
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Critical to the Langdellian representation of law as a science was
the central role that Langdell accorded to cases. Cases were the speci-
mens to be studied. They were to be studied for the doctrines and the
principles that they embodied. The vehicle that enabled this study
was the casebook - a compendium of cases selected and organized by
the law professors to inculcate the law. In its time, one of the most
significant and controversial aspects of the casebook approach was its
firm rejection of legal treatises and lectures as instruments of law
school instruction.8 6
Langdell and his brethren systematized a purportedly unruly array
of cases into a pyramidal structure of clean, conceptual doctrines,
linked to each other by a series of principles. They subdivided law
into discrete fields, such as contracts or torts, each with its own foun-
dational aesthetic. Thus Langdellian synthesis accomplished an im-
pressive formalization of law. As Christopher Columbus Langdell
himself put it:
The vast majority [of cases] are useless, and worse than useless, for any
purpose of systematic study. Moreover, the number of fundamental legal
doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed; the many different
guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance,
and the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each
other, being the cause of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could
be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper
place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their
number.8 7
In this formalization, several aspects were critical for the representa-
tion and development of American law.
First, the Langdellian vision posited a specification of the formal
ontology of the law - the critical identities or forms that American
law takes. The Langdellian vision pre-figured law as a collection of
"doctrines and principles."8 These artifactual forms became the pre-
cincts where law was to be found. Law was to be found not in mind-
sets, or attitudes, or habits or skills, or anything of the sort, but in-
stead in propositional statements cast as discrete object-forms. This
aesthetic of law has lasted until the present day. The stabilization of
identities presumed into existence by this formal ontology of the law is
what enables such claims as the assertion that law is "objective" and
"neutral." It is this presumption that law exists in the manner of ob-
ject-forms that enables the objectivist colloquialisms that law can be
"found" and that judges should "apply" the law, not "make" it.
86 See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SoCIAL Sci.
ENCE 25-26 (r995).
87 C.C. LANGDELL, Preface to the First Edition of SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS at viii-ix (2d ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879).
88 Id. at vii (emphasis added).
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A second critical aspect of the Langdellian formalization was its
creation of an autonomous sphere of law. By positing that American
law "consists of certain principles or doctrines . . . traced in the main
through a series of cases," 9 the Langdellian formalization gently
shifted the principal situs of law away from the courts and their cases
toward the legal academy and its doctrines and principles. According
to the Langdellian formalization, the case decisions of the courts were
merely the embodiments through which doctrines and principles were
expressed and developed. To be sure, the "original sources" must be
closely examined in order to arrive at the proper distillation of case
law into doctrines and principles. But the distillation - the declara-
tion of what the law is - would be the special province of the law
school. What the Langdellians wanted, in short, was to follow the
path of the German legal academics with their "detailed, systematic,
sustained, and comprehensive works of scholarship."90
In this endeavor, the Langdellians faced a problem very much the
same as that faced by Gall in his attempt to identify the "fundamental
faculties." Langdell's problem was how to identify the true and cor-
rect doctrines and principles. Unlike Gall, Langdell apparently never
fashioned a clear methodology to accomplish this kind of task beyond
the rather abstract requirements of consistency, coherence, hierarchy,
and conceptual boundary maintenance. 91
A third critical aspect of the Langdellian formalization was that it
posited an internal order to law - an order marked by consistency,
coherence, hierarchy, and conceptual boundary maintenance. This or-
der could be identified by examining the original sources, the judicial
opinions in which the order would appear. The task of the Langdel-
lian scholar was to unearth the order, these principles and "essential
doctrines,"92 from their sometimes befuddled, inadequate, and incom-
plete expression in the case law. Langdell not. only gave his fellow
scholars their own distinct field of objects to study, but he also pro-
vided them with an academic mission, the same academic mission that
would be performed by law students themselves - namely, the close
examination of case law and the arrangement and classification of "es-
sential doctrines."93
The Langdellian formalization was in many respects similar to
Gall's efforts to render the study of the human brain and human be-
havior a scientific enterprise. One notable difference has been of last-
ing significance. Gall sought to establish categories of a functional
89 Id.
90 SCHLEGEL, supra note 86, at 27; see id. at 46.
91 For a discussion of these aesthetic requirements, see SCHLEGEL, cited above in note 86, at
37, and Thomas C. Grey, LangdeU's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PiTT. L. REv. x, 6-11 (1983).
92 LANGDELL, supra note 87, at ix.
93 See John Henry SchIegel, Langdell's Legacy or, the Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN.
L. Rav. i517, 1529-30 (z984) (book review).
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character to explain individualized human behavior. Langdell's fun-
damental categories - his doctrines and principles - by contrast,
were prefunctional. Langdell did not identify fundamental doctrines
and principles in order to explain how some judicial decision was ac-
tually reached. Instead, Langdell formulated doctrines and principles
in order to enable the recognition of correct (and incorrect) case law
decisions. His categories of doctrines and principles were thus, from
the very beginning, designedly normative in character - aimed at
judging which judicial decisions were law (and which were not).
Moreover, the objects of study - the case law decisions - were
themselves already rigorously idealized. Langdellian science concen-
trated not on the outcomes or meanings of a case, broadly understood,
but rather on its "holding" or its "doctrine." The result is that the
Langdellian science operated within an idealized realm of its own cre-
ation. This idealization of the objects of study was in contrast with
the functional ambitions of phrenology. In a sense, the Langdellian
effort was much closer to the aesthetics of the metaphysical philoso-
phers than to the kind of functional science that Gall sought to estab-
lish. Just as Locke sought to understand the categories of mind that
would ground the ability of human beings to reach true inductions, 94
Langdell wished to identify the categories of law - the doctrines and
principles - that would ground the ability to reach correct legal
decisions.
Yet despite his idealizing tendencies, Langdell's commitment to the
empirical analysis of case opinions seems to have been sincere. In a
gesture that would be repeated by many generations of American legal
thinkers - particularly among the great number who came to be edu-
cated at Harvard Law School - Langdell sought to distill the law
from an empirical examination of case law "specimens." For American
legal thinkers, even late into the twentieth century, this empirical
survey of case law, and the integration of useful case law into the
Langdellian taxonomy, came to be synonymous with "knowing" the
law.
B. Principles, Doctrines, and Other Reified Animisms
The Langdellian distillation of case law into fundamental legal
doctrines and principles was an exercise in clarification, systematiza-
tion, and classification. As in the case of phrenology, however, the
doctrines and principles of the new legal science were not just descrip-
tive classifications. Langdell's doctrines and principles were not just
helpful heuristic devices for the sorting of case law. They were the
law itself. Hence, they came to be cast as robust object-forms with
stabilized identities. Indeed, this reification was an important aspect
of the reductive ambitions of the Langdellian project - to state the
94 See supra pp. 887-88.
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"fundamental" and the "essential" doctrines and principles, so as to
simplify the law. This reductive gesture would find strong echoes
throughout the history of American law - in the codification move-
ments of the late nineteenth century,95 in the seriatim ALI restate-
ments of the twentieth century,9 6 in the attempts to subject law to the
discipline of grand normative "theory" of the late twentieth century,9 7
and even in the structuralist representations of doctrine of Critical
Legal Studies scholars.98
Not only were the Langdellian categories reified, but they were en-
dowed with animistic properties: they were cast as agencies capable of
shaping the development of the law. As Langdell put it, "[e]ach of
these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in
other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries.
This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cases ...
in which it is embodied."99 In Langdell's law, doctrines and principles
were doing some amazing things - and doing them, fully animated,
all by themselves. Hence Langdell would say, "Equity will . . . annex
to such a contract an obligation directly to B . . ,,.o0 For Langdell,
Equity was always annexing this, or annexing that, or creating this
obligation or that one - and doing so all by itself, without the assist-
ance of courts or counsel. Indeed, Langdell said as much: "Many equi-
table obligations are created ... by equity alone .... For example, it
is by force of equity alone that an equitable obligation follows the
property . . . ."101
The construction of these "doctrines" and "principles" as ontologi-
cally robust, reified, animated agencies was neither a stylistic idiosyn-
crasy nor mere metaphorical excess. Rather, the stylistic formalism of
Langdell's mode of expression was essential to his substantive repre-
sentation of law.10 2 Just as it was essential to phrenology that phre-
nologists believe in the equation of fundamental faculties with the
functions of various cortical organs and that they believe that the fac-
ulties caused certain behaviors, it was essential to the Langdellian pro-
ject that Langdell and his followers believe in the equation of
fundamental doctrines and principles with law and that they believe
that these doctrines and principles governed the development of law.
To sustain that sort of belief, the doctrines and principles had to be
95 See, e.g., Codification, 2o AM. L. REV. i (i886).
96 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (ig8i).
97 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at vii-xv (1977).
98 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. i685, 1687-1701 (1976).
99 LANGDELL, supra note 87, at viii (emphasis added).
100 C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisprudence, I HARV. L. REV. 55, 71 (1887),
reprinted in C.C. LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1905).
101 Id. at 67.
102 For a contemporary demonstration of the connection between linguistic formalism and legal
formalism, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 520-35 (1988).
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cast as reified animated agencies. For law to be law, it was absolutely
necessary not only that case decisions conform to certain coherent pat-
terns, but that something exist that could be equated to law itself and
that would make these decisions conform to certain coherent patterns.
The foundational gesture of Langdellianism is the same as that of
phrenology. A certain pattern is abstracted from the data (here case
law decisions). The pattern is then projected back onto imagined re-
ified enabling agencies - such as "doctrines" and "principles." The
enabling agencies are then equated with law and, quite fortuitously,
found to be at once generative of and constraining upon the official
decisions of judges and other officials.
At various points in the late twentieth century, belief in the
Langdellian agencies of certain "essential doctrines and principles"
broke down. With the onslaught of legal realism, the travails of legal
process, the corrosive contributions of consequentialist reasoning, the
normative adventures of rights and principles jurisprudence, and the
reductive stylizations of microeconomics and Critical Legal Studies,
much was added to the legal repertoire.
C. The Persistence of the Langdellian Paradigm
In the contemporary American legal academy, it is widely assumed
that Langdellianism is "history." The dominant assumption is that "we
are all realists now" and that, even if some of us are not realists, we
are all far more sophisticated than Langdell at any rate. Indeed, one
would be hard-pressed to name many contemporary self-avowed
Langdellians. To the contrary, among late twentieth-century American
legal thinkers, it is almost de rigueur to "reject" or "renounce"
Langdellianism as misguided, if not downright looney.103
The very fact that virtually all American legal thinkers explicitly
"reject" or "renounce" Langdellianism is usually understood in the
American legal academy to spell the demise of the Langdellian para-
digm. Indeed, the very fact that Langdellianism is roundly rejected
throughout the legal academy is often taken to be conclusive evidence
that Langdellianism has been overcome.
This conclusion, however, is something of a non sequitur. Such
"rejections" of Langdellianism are, after all, nothing but mere represen-
tations of belief. They are statements made by legal thinkers about
what they believe; they are, in short, beliefs about the speaker's be-
liefs. But there's the rub: what a person says he believes and what he
does believe are not necessarily (or perhaps even usually) the same
thing. Still less can an obvious identity be presumed between one's
beliefs and one's practices.
103 See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 467, 467 (1988) (book
review).
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This assumption that one's beliefs have a regulative force on one's
other beliefs is, once noticed, rather incredible. How then have Ameri-
can legal thinkers come to believe that their explicit renunciation of
Langdellianism is tantamount to overcoming Langdellianism? The an-
swer is decidedly ironic: the routine supposition among American legal
thinkers that one's beliefs are regulative of what one believes in prac-
tice is itself a psychological mimesis of Langdellianism. Just as
Langdellianism holds that declared law is regulative of law in practice,
American legal thinkers presume that their declared beliefs about their
own legal beliefs are regulative of their legal beliefs in practice.
This unwitting psychological mimesis is emblematic of the hold
that the Langdellian paradigm continues to exercise on American legal
thought. Specifically, the Langdellian paradigm is still with us in
ways that, by virtue of its continued dominance, remain largely unno-
ticed. This disciplinary self-effacement is neither strange nor surpris-
ing: it is instead one of the ways in which a disciplinary paradigm can
achieve success.
A disciplinary paradigm can achieve success by depriving its par-
ticipants of the ability to recognize its foundational gestures, thereby
enabling the paradigm to be projected and thus "re-discovered" end-
lessly on new terrain - in case after case. The inability of the partici-
pants to recognize the foundational gestures ensures that the search for
the disciplinary object is neither consummated nor discontinued. 10 4
The search is never consummated because the disciplinary object does
not exist as such: it is a construction of the foundational gestures -
gestures that remain invisible to the participants. At the same time,
and also ironically, the inability of the participants to recognize the
foundational gestures helps maintain interest in the search because the
searchers keep "finding" evidence confirming the truth of the paradigm
on the new terrain - in case after case, jurisprudence after
jurisprudence.
One aspect of the Langdellian paradigm that is still very much in
force is the supposition that "the law" is located in and can be found
in such artifacts as the Langdellian "doctrines and principles." To be
sure, the list of authorized artifacts has grown to include not only doc-
trines and principles, but policies, tests, values, techniques, models,
methods, and theories as well. But what remains the same are the
assumptions that the law is to be "found in," "contained in," "located
in," and "provided by" such artifactual entities. Although all of these
entities have different properties within the American "legal cosmol-
ogy,"'05 they each share certain interesting artifactual attributes: each
of these artifacts (from "doctrine" to "theory") is endowed with some
104 See JOHN MoWiT, TEXT: THE GENEALOGY OF AN ANTIDISCIPLINARY OBJECT 40-41
(1992).
105 See generally REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY
OF BUDDHIST TIBET 57-60 (I99s) (describing "legal cosmology" as the underlying assumptions
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
power to regulate its object-field and each is at once a repository and
an agency of "the law."
Interestingly, although new artifacts have been explicitly added to
the legal repertoire, the new additions bear the marks of Langdellian
artifactuality. Hence the late twentieth-century acceptance of "legal
theory," which to many American legal thinkers seemed a radical and
irresponsible departure from "solid doctrinal work," turned out to be
well within the Langdellian orthodoxy. Just as Langdell sought to in-
tegrate cases into the organizing taxonomy of "certain doctrines and
principles," late twentieth-century thinkers sought to integrate certain
doctrines and principles into an organizing taxonomy of theory. To
put it perhaps too bluntly, "legal theory" has often been little more
than Langdellianism raised to the second power - a doctrine of the
doctrine - a meta-doctrine that, like the original, was addressed at
least nominally to courts and purported to direct their legal decisions.
Often such "theory" was praised and criticized by other legal academ-
ics using criteria typically used to evaluate doctrine: is the "theory"
determinate, realizable, practicable, anchored in authority, internally
coherent, and the like? And like court-issued law generally, "legal the-
ory" was often portrayed as neutral in provenance and intent, autono-
mous in character, context-transcendent in scope, and regulative of its
object-field.
This process by which the stamp of Langdellian artifactuality is
impressed upon new additions to the American legal repertoire is re-
peated endlessly, automatically. Ostensible departures from the
Langdellian paradigm are almost immediately reappropriated. 106 For
instance, one of the purportedly "revolutionary" modifications of
Langdellianism was the recognition that social and institutional agents
known as "courts" or, more generically, "decisionmakers" contribute to
the development of the law. Langdell originally established a law so
pure, so formal that it mysteriously worked all by itself: doctrine did
things to other doctrines seemingly unassisted by any human or insti-
tutional agency. Ironically, as soon as social agents, such as "the
court," were recognized within the legal repertoire, they became im-
printed with the marks of Langdellian artifactuality. Hence, the
American legal thinker's dominant image of "the court" is pervasively
legalicized: the court is an agency whose identity is fashioned in the
image of American law. It is a constellation of specific legal duties,
obligations, and powers - a construction of legalist discourse.
upon which the legal system is built and arguing that these "conceptual and practical building
blocks" vary among different cultures).
106 For one example of this reappropriation, consider Robin West's use of Stanley Fish's "inter-
pretive community." See Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 241,
267-68 (1993) (using the interpretive community notion as the grounds to "consider not just alter-
natives to received meanings of constitutional phrases, but alternatives to received understandings
of the idea of constitutionalism and the idea of law" as well).
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Although "the court" may be a term that points to a social agency that
exceeds legality, in American legal thought, this social agency is none-
theless cast in the Langdellian aesthetic. "The court," as the expres-
sion is understood in American legal thought, is itself cast as a
construction of the law.
The same imprinting of the Langdellian aesthetic occurs with other
markers that ostensibly point toward the social. Hence, no sooner are
signifiers, such as "social construction," "culture," "practices," "poli-
tics," and the like, introduced to American legal thought than they be-
come domesticated by and reconfigured in the image of the
Langdellian aesthetic.
This pattern of domestication and reconfiguration can be seen at
work in the interdisciplinary context as well. Whether the talk is of
microeconomics, deconstruction, Frankfurt school critical theory, his-
tory, or whathaveyou, legal thinkers are forever recasting foreign disci-
plines in the Langdellian aesthetic. It is in this way, for instance, that
what Stanley Fish calls the "interpretive community" becomes reified
into an identifiable authority otherwise known as the American legal
profession. 10 7 It is in this way too that the careful epistemological ni-
hilism of Ronald Coase'08 becomes petrified into a foundation for
countless "constructive" prescriptions on how to improve the efficiency
of the law.' 0 9 This domestication and reconfiguration continues when
Foucault enters the legal academy and is promptly offered as an au-
thority for the Supreme Court." 0 And the same pattern is seen again
when the perspectival anti-formalist moments of American pragma-
tism are used to privilege the perspectives of certain highly stereotypi-
cal classes of "the oppressed.""'
The raw improbability of these projects is testimony to the contin-
ued hold of the Langdeliian paradigm. What is improbable is not ex-
amining law from the perspective of a Fish, a Coase, a Foucault, a
James; such perspectives might produce some understanding of what
law is, what it is not, and of what its limitations are. What is com-
pletely improbable is the prospect of transforming any of these per-
spectives into law. Moreover, it is improbable from both the legal and
the extra-legal perspectives. From the perspective of the legal, it is
doubtful that many agents charged with making or finding law would
adopt any of these approaches. From the perspective of the extra-
legal, Fish, Foucault, and company, exhibit a certain resistance to their
107 See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 746 (1982).
108 See George L. Priest, Gossiping About Ideas, 93 YALE L.J. 1625, 1635 (1984) (book review).
109 The early editions of Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law evidence this prescriptive
use of transaction cost analysis. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
r7-I8 (ist ed. r973).
110 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783, 802-07 (i989) (using
the writings of Foucault to refashion the constitutional right of privacy).
Ill Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 17o8
(1990).
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assimilation into the law form - particularly, the Langdellian law
form.
The efforts of legal thinkers to transform such improbable sources
of knowledge into law are symptomatic of the continued hold of the
Langdellian paradigm. These efforts are typical of what one does -
what one is supposed to do - as a legal thinker. The task is to sub-
sume, subordinate, and envelop new material, new contexts, and new
problems within the Langdellian aesthetic. For elite legal thinkers, the
task is basically to police law's empire, to guard its gates, to restate its
timeless truths, and to deliver up new colonies.
This brings us to another aspect of the continued hold of the
Langdellian paradigm. Despite significant contributions from ostensi-
bly anti-Langdellian corners of the academy - legal realism, Critical
Legal Studies, law and society, microeconomics - the self-image and
persona of the legal thinker remain largely the same. In the time of
Langdell, the self-image of the legal thinker was that of a judge of the
judges. The legal thinker sifted through legal opinions to distill the
kernel of truth: certain doctrines and principles. Conforming prece-
dent would be approved; non-conforming precedent rejected. In the
late twentieth century, the list of artifacts to be judged and the kinds
of issues to be adjudicated has grown. But the role of the legal
thinker as a kind of meta-judge remains the same.
In short, ever since Langdell, the fundamental paradigmatic activ-
ity has been one of sorting, evaluating, adjudicating, and subsuming
things so that they become, or become subordinate to, the Langdellian
aesthetic. Like the judges whom they imitate, legal thinkers under-
stand themselves to be engaged in the enterprise of "doing law."
American legal thinkers have introjected into their own disciplinary
paradigm the standards, the criteria, the rituals, the forms of knowl-
edge, the idioms, the local ideologies, the habits, the proficiencies, and
the professional deformations of those they claim to study - the
courts, the judges, and the legislators. They are, in short, like anthro-
pologists who "have gone native" with their own tribe.
D. The Self-Referentiality of Law
One result of this introjection is that the discipline of American
law curiously collapses its objects of study with its method of study.
The objects of study often bear such names as doctrines, principles,
policies, and tests. These, it turns out, are the fundamental units of
analysis employed in explaining and understanding law itself. As a
result, law becomes a vigorously self-referential universe - one in
which the various units of analysis are used to identify, explain, and
understand other units of analysis and vice versa."12
112 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
RFv. 8og, 814 (1935). Circularity itself is not the problem: rather, the problem is what circularity
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The circularity of American law is pervasive. To engage in the
enterprise of American legal thought is not only to argue in a circle,
but also to argue with elements whose identities are the intersections
of various circles. Even fundamental units are composed of a variety
of chains of signification. For instance, the juridical entity known as a
"constitutional right" is constituted as a more or less stabilized inter-
section of linguistic formalism (the text), primitive psychologism (the
framers' intent), naive instrumentalist social theory (means/ends analy-
sis), and moral animism (principles and values). These and other
chains of signification intersect and blend with each other to produce
what legal thinkers call a "constitutional right." Hence, the very iden-
tity of a unit of analysis is an intersection of various other units of
analysis.
In consequence, the fundamental terms of analysis remain radically
underspecified and, perhaps more to the point, radically unspecifiable.
At the end of the twentieth century, a great many plausible things can
thus be said about the fundamental units of analysis. For example,
any of the following propositions can still be maintained:
something is not law because it is not just;113
something is law even though it is not just;1 1 4
something is law because it is just;1" 5 or
something cannot be at once law and just. 16
The problem is not, as some would have it, a lack of "rigor." Rigor
was never a possibility. The object of study - for instance, what is
called a "right" - is ontologically constituted in a way that defies
rigor: it is protean, pluralistic, and relational, except, of course, when
it is fixed, monistic, and autonomous.
Not only is there no disciplinary method for identifying what
counts as one doctrine, one principle, or one unit of analysis - the
problem of individuation faced, but not answered by Langdell - but
it turns out that there is also no specified method for distinguishing
the doctrines, principles, or units of analysis that are authentic from
those that are spurious. To put it simply, in American law, there is no
method because there is no specified core ontology, and there is no
specified core ontology because there is no method.
In addition, there is no accepted specification of the rules of trans-
formation. It remains unclear, for instance, how a principle might or
might not affect a doctrine (or vice versa) or how a theory is supposed
to affect principles and doctrines. To take a simple example, consider
hides and what it reveals. Specifically, the problem arises when circularity, by "working" so
smoothly, hides something that is interesting and discloses something that is not.
113 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 639 (1994).
114 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 628-29 (1958).
115 See RONALD DwoRKiN, LAw's EMPIRE 97 (1986).
116 See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundatio i f Authority," ii CARDozo
L. REv. 99, 941, 943 (Mary Quaintance trans., 199o).
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the relation between a "rule" and the "reason behind the rule." In
some cases, the reason behind the rule virtually determines the rule's
content. In other cases, the reason behind the rule justifies, but has no
significant effect on the rule's content. It is in this way that the rela-
tionship between a "rule" and the "reason behind the rule" is
contextual.
Because the units of analysis lack any robust or stabilized referent
and because the relations that can possibly be established among these
units of analysis are radically underspecified, a great many (often in-
compatible) things can be said about how the various units of analysis
relate to each other or to actual judicial decisionmaking. This phe-
nomenon, which in Critical Legal Studies parlance is called "indeter-
minacy," 117 does not simply occur "externally" - in the counter-
positioning of legal doctrines or other legal artifacts. The indetermi-
nacy arises "internally" as well - within a "single" legal artifact. In
other words, when legal thinkers refer to "rules" or "rights," there is a
profound sense in which they literally do not - and, moreover, can-
not - know what they are talking about."18 Every "rule," "right," or
other legal artifact is a locus not only of determination, but of non-
determination as well.
In law, as in phrenology, the underspecification of the fundamental
units of analysis, their relation, and the ways in which they are identi-
fied allows practitioners to produce a great deal of complexity.
Throughout the twentieth century, this complexity has blossomed. A
series of operations and questions facilitated the creation of ever more
detailed analytical sub-categories, exceptions, predicate conditions, and
the like. These operations and questions could be repeated at each
new level of law's conceptual organization. Questions such as: What
counts as evidence? What is the burden of proof? What is the appro-
priate procedure for taking cognizance of this issue? Does this institu-
tional body have jurisdiction? What do these terms mean? How does
this term modify that one? Are these terms sufficiently well specified?
On whose authority? Is this authority valid? On what grounds?" 9
The legal-process thinking that emerged in the American legal
academy of the late 195os and early ig6os celebrated such detailed
117 For a brief discussion of various indeterminacy claims, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of
the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1627, 683 n.,95 (199').
118 For elaboration, see Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec.
1996) (discussing the paradoxical ontology of "law); Pierre Schlag, Rights in the Postmodern Con-
dition, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHMOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 263, 302-03 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., r996); Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 219, 226-27
(1994).
119 Cf Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, z958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, io7-o8 (1959) (asking a similar series of questions).
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inquiry.120 In this conceptual universe, there was no reason for the
process of questioning ever to end. For every answer given, a host of
questions could be asked again, repeatedly, interminably. Much of the
overwrought and overconstructed character of contemporary trials,
Supreme Court opinions, and law review articles is traceable to the
exasperatingly picayune aesthetic of this mid-century jurisprudence. 12'
Of course, legal thinkers have made numerous attempts to systema-
tize law through the imposition of reductive schemes: everthing from
the late nineteenth-century codification movements to the late twenti-
eth-century "legal theory." But despite these attempts at systematiza-
tion, the complexity of American law has proliferated. Ironically,
every reductive effort seems to have produced yet more complexity.
This perverse effect results from the failure of any reductive effort to
take hold completely. Such failure is, in turn, predictable given the
non-determination at the heart of the legal ontology: there is nothing
determinately there to reduce down to.
To a large extent, this self-referential complexity has bolstered be-
lief in law. In its vastness, this self-referential complexity both ena-
bled and confirmed the possibility of making seemingly sophisticated
moves within the edifice of law itself. The promise was that a mas-
tery of law combined with sufficient native intellectual power would
enable the performance of some truly admirable intellectual operations.
In the solemn words of Henry Hart:
Thus, the Court is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling
tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position
in the structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and
developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law and
impersonal and durable principles for the interpretation of statutes and
the resolution of difficult issues of decisional law. 122
The very magnitude and grandeur of the discipline of law - its
impressive collection of ostensible bits of knowledge - contributed
mightily to the sense that there was truly something there. Indeed, the
vastness and the magnitude of the edifice made it difficult for anyone
to believe that an enterprise possessed of so much information could
be almost entirely bereft of knowledge or insight.
Moreover, the self-referential complexity of law led to a discipli-
nary orientation toward the micro-context. Faced with the daunting
mass of legal materials, legal thinkers, law teachers, and law students
often eschewed big questions in favor of purportedly small-scale ques-
tions. The result of this preference for resolving "concrete legal
120 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at cxxxviii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (reprinting the unpublished tentative edition of 1958).
121 See RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 75-77 (1995).
122 Hart, supra note ixg, at 99.
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problems," this micro-perspective, was to render a great deal of non-
sense seemingly quite plausible.
For eiample, if one asks whether a single appellate opinion is ele-
gant in mastering its "tensions,"' 23 it is easy to forget that an appellate
opinion is but a small moment in a vast and ugly enterprise of case-
crunching and citation-mongering. Similarly, if one asks whether com-
parative negligence is more efficient than contributory negligence, it is
easy to forget that negligence law, with its intense fact-specific inquir-
ies, its preposterous range of damage awards, and its expensive, quasi-
cartelized personnel, is a decidedly odd place to look for efficiency in
the first place. Likewise, if one is forced to consider whether it is
more reasonable to use a seven factor ALI Restatement (Third) test or
a five factor ALI Restatement (Second) test, it is easy to forget that it
would be most reasonable to dismiss the question itself as prima facie
unreasonable. And, again, if the question is whether this or that moral
justification is right, one could easily forget that, in law, moral argu-
ment is largely a sales technique - the jurisprudential equivalent of
advertising.
By indulging an instinct for the small scale, American legal think-
ers can forget just where they are: the context is obliterated. The
small-scale orientation enables legal thinkers to believe that they know
something - for they have mastered the details of one very small area
extremely well. But, ironically, their claim to know this one small area
depends upon the resolution of large-scale questions that they have
studiously avoided. And ultimately, the value of any conclusion they
draw depends upon the strength of the large-scale answers that they
unwittingly provide to questions they have not asked.12 4
Still, legal thinkers seem to believe, or at least to act as if, they
know something. Yet the belief that legal thinkers know anything is
on no more solid ground than the belief that phrenologists knew any-
thing. Phrenologists, after all, also had a massive assemblage of bits of
information. It has turned out, of course, that this knowledge was
wrong. Although phrenology achieved a massive integration of many
carefully arranged propositions, the phrenologists did not really know
anything. What phrenologists knew was nothing more than what
other phrenologists believed they knew, and what they knew was not
knowledge.
Legal thinkers may well face the same predicament. What legal
thinkers know is what other legal thinkers believe they know. Legal
thinkers know how other legal thinkers will think about things -
what kinds of arguments they are likely to make, what sources they
123 See JAMES BOYD WHITE, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem, in HERACLES' Bow: Es-
SAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 107, 117-19, 135 (985).
124 This is why one of the most difficult and vulnerable moments in writing a conventional
law review piece is in the delimitation of its jurisdiction. It is almost always an intellectually
unjustifiable operation that nonetheless must be performed in order for the work to even begin.
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will draw upon, what values and concerns they will invoke, and what
conclusions they will offer. 12s This knowledge is, in short, knowledge
of the beliefs shared by particular kinds of persons - namely, persons
who have undergone the same formal legal training.
Knowing such beliefs allows legal thinkers to operate competently
within the web of beliefs known as "law." In this minimalist sense,
one might say law "works." Mastery of these beliefs and knowledge of
their self-referential organization, however, guarantees nothing about
the status of those beliefs. It suggests nothing about whether the web
of belief is true, insightful, ethically appealing, or intellectually
interesting.
For those who operate within this self-referential web of belief,
knowledge of the ropes, the knowledge of how to "move" within the
system, produces the illusion that they have knowledge of the law.
The ability to produce results, outcomes, and conclusions that are ac-
cepted by the relevant community operates to confirm the sense that
the members of the legal community actually possess knowledge of the
law. Because legal actors see each other "doing law," they come to
believe that they too know how to do law. Further, they come to be-
lieve that there is a knowledge of the law, a discipline, that informs
their knowledge of how to do law.
This belief structure is similar to the structure of the faculty-think-
ing of phrenology. The perception of successful legal acts (winning a
case) is attributed to a performance (the "doing of law') that is attrib-
uted back to a "knowing" of the ropes that is then reified and attrib-
uted back to a "discipline" of law, namely, the "knowledge" of an
imaginary object-form known as "the law." At the same time, knowl-
edge of the law is held to be crucial to the knowledge of how to oper-
ate within the legal system that is held to produce the competent
doing of law that is then assumed to translate into successful legal
acts.
The self-referential universe can be diagrammed as follows:
KNOWLEDGE enables KNOWING enables COMPETENT enables SUCCESSFUL
OF THE LAW -> THE ROPES -> "DOING OF -> LEGAL ACTS
(e.g., confirms (e.g., confirms LAW" confirms (e.g., winning
knowledge of <- knowledge of <- (e.g., a case,
the discipline how to argue competent closing a
of law - of in court, how performance deal, or
legal to draft legal of legal settling a
doctrines, documents, argument) dispute)
principles, and how to
statutes, etc.) conduct
negotiations)
Those who believe in "law" operate within this self-referential uni-
verse. Not surprisingly, most criticism voiced by American legal
thinkers of law teaching or legal scholarship has occurred within the
125 See RicaARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 1oo (199o).
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confines of this schema. Most of the internal criticism lies in challeng-
ing one or more of the various connections between knowledge of the
law, at one end, and performing successful legal acts, at the other end.
The great success of this self-referential universe of American law,
of course, is that unlike phrenology, tremendous consequences -
mandatory incarceration, forcible reallocation of wealth, even death -
often turn upon "the doing of law." When so much turns upon this
"doing," it is easy to project the apparent power of "the doing" back to
a knowledge that ostensibly informs the "doing" - namely, knowledge
of the law. The seriousness and even validity of "knowledge of the
law" becomes affirmed through the manifest importance of the results
that it seems to produce. Similarly, the crucial ethical, political, and
practical significance of successful (and unsuccessful) acts of law pro-
duces powerful (ethical and psychological) incentives for those in-
volved in the practice of law to believe that they "know" what they
are doing - and that there is a "knowledge" of law that informs their
doing of law.
This brings us to the self-legitimating aspects of law. Like the
phrenologists, legal thinkers since the beginning of the academy have
been oriented toward producing legitimations of their discipline. Like
the phrenologists, they have wanted to believe. For the legal academ-
ics, not only were their jobs at stake, but also their status as academ-
ics. Belief in law has allowed legal thinkers to believe that they
possess a discipline, a body of knowledge - if not a science, at least
an expertise. It has also provided a certain degree of psychological
tranquility: the belief in law has, in the absence of a widely-held pub-
lic religion, served to comfort people in the thought that the social
world is organized in a rational and normatively appealing manner. It
has thus seemed to many legal thinkers as if much has been at stake.
E. The Self-Legitimating Character of Law
Like the phrenologists then, American legal thinkers have been ori-
ented toward the legitimation of their discipline. They have sought to
validate, to justify, and to rationalize law. In striking contrast to phre-
nology, which claimed to describe and explain the actual, American
law was, from its Langdellian beginnings, already framed in terms of
an idealized ontology.
Langdellian science was normative from the very beginning. It
was normative in the sense that it sought to develop norms that would
allow the identification and regulation of idealized entities - namely,
judicial opinions (which, in turn, would themselves announce idealized
entities, namely, norm-forms). Although phrenology was devoted, at
least at its inception, to the explanation of actual human behavior,
Langdell's law was devoted from the very beginning to the adjudica-
tion of the "correctness" of already highly idealized objects - namely
judicial decisions.
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The implications of this point are interesting and important and
have been long-lasting. From the very beginning, Langdell's law was
at once an articulation as well as a legitimation of the law. Langdell's
law, like subsequent American law, was constructed to be at once
what it was, as well as its own justification. The circularity, the self-
referentiality of law, was thus built into its core ontology.
American law is a kind of normative Mobius strip. Its identity is
to be both what it is and what it ought to be. This self-legitimating
self-referentiality has played a large role in insulating law from serious
critique. 126 Indeed, criticism of law is stunted at the outset, for there
can be no statement of what the law is apart from an idealizing rendi-
tion of this law. Similarly, there can be no statement of what the law
ought to be apart from a recognition of what it is.
F. Folk Ways, Folk Lore, and Folk Law
Like phrenology, the discipline of American law has tracked,
evoked, and incorporated folk-ontologies and folk-frames. Thus the
views of human nature and human beings that are represented in
American law are consonant with folk understandings. For instance,
throughout the common law and statutory law we find pictures of
human beings cast in a rather simplistic folk psychologism. This psy-
chologism represents human beings as essentially rational, self-di-
recting individuals animated by mental states described variously as
intentional, reckless, or negligent. This image of the individual subject
as free-willed is complemented (and counterpoised), as in folk culture,
with a more deterministic vision demarcated by notions of coercion,
duress, compulsion, insanity, and the like.
The law likewise casts its operations within a folk frame of binary
oppositions such as:
mind/body;
idealism/materialism;
reason/power;
public/private.
These binary oppositions, which describe the structure of folk belief,
are evoked in the very structure of law. For example, in the folk
frame, as in American law, reason and reasoned discourse are seen as
distinct from and regulative of the exercise of power, behavior, and
the like. Folk belief is thus incorporated in the very basic organization
and structure of law.
Similarly, law evokes folk myths of order, salvation, perfection, and
progress. Much of the action of law is described in soothing narratives
that promise that these myths will be realized or maintained. Indeed,
126 Cf Cohen, supra note 112, at 838 (pointing out that "if the law is something that com-
mands what is right and prohibits what is wrong, it is impossible to argue about the goodness or
badness of any law").
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a great deal of the controversy within American law concerns conflict
between various (often theological) narratives of redemption. Such re-
current narrative conflicts pit
order against progress;
security against freedom;
stability against change.
Finally, a great deal of substantive law tracks not only narrative
myths, but also emotional complexes. The structure of criminal causes
of action can be understood in terms of anger. Much of property law
- for instance, the action of trespass - can be understood in terms of
fear: fear of loss of control, fear of contamination, and the like. One
reason that trials are so gripping in American culture, and so often
featured as vehicles of entertainment, is that they are premiere arenas
in which forbidden emotions can be experienced - authentically or
vicariously - without fear of censure. They facilitate the organized
and scripted release of aggression, hatred, and even sadism.
IV. WHY LAW Is DIFFERENT FROM PHRENOLOGY
One of the major differences between law and phrenology is that
the latter was ultimately subject to empirical refutation, but the for-
mer is not. In part, this difference has to do with the relationship
between each discipline and its objects of study. Phrenological knowl-
edge encompassed aspects of physical nature that are relatively ob-
server-independent (i.e., brains and skulls). Consequently, neither
phrenology nor its successor sciences were necessary for their objects
of study to do their work: the brain and the skull do their work per-
fectly well (or perfectly badly) whether they are being studied by a
discipline or not. But the reverse was not true. Because phrenology
advanced statements about brains and skulls, its knowledge was ulti-
mately subject to constraint and verification in terms of these desig-
nated aspects of physical nature.
Law is very different. What counts as law in American society is a
function of what those who are authorized (a deliberately vague term)
say it is. This ambiguous and Protean provenance for law makes the
discipline of American law much more vulnerable, much more fragile
because there is no subject-independent nature to sustain the beliefs of
American legal thinkers. In a related sense, however, this same prove-
nance makes the discipline of American law much more resilient be-
cause there is no possibility of falsifiability independent of the beliefs
of those who are authorized to say what the law is.
In contrast to phrenology, the relations of the discipline of law to
its objects of study are quite complicated. The discipline of law rests
on a fundamental ambiguity in the referent of that crucial term
--..
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"law."1 27 The term "law" refers to the legitimate decisionmaking of
authorized bodies such as courts. Law is thus a kind of authoritative
action. The term "law" also refers to the intelligent source that is sup-
posed to govern this authoritative action. Law is thus a kind of intel-
ligent knowledge. Because the expression "law" refers both to
authoritative action and intelligent knowledge, the expression is am-
biguous. Consider the following permutations: Law means . . .
intelligent knowledge;
authoritative action;
intelligent knowledge constraining authoritative action;
authoritative action expressed as intelligent knowledge.
Obviously, many other permutations are possible. Simply adding the
following qualifiers - "always," "often," "sometimes," "only," "essen-
tially," "generally," or "ideally" - at strategic places produces a great
many other permutations.
The important thing to recognize, however, is not just the ambigu-
ity, but also that the ambiguity and its associated slippage cannot be
eradicated without losing crucial aspects of what is called "law." The
reason is simple: what is called law is, among other things, the rela-
tions between law as authoritative action and law as intelligent knowl-
edge. The plurality of such relations is sufficient to render the term
"law" ambiguous and slippery. There is more, however: it turns out
that each sense of law (intelligent knowledge and authoritative action)
is the source for the specification of the other. Hence, something is
law (in the sense of authoritative action) to the extent that the authori-
tative action is generated or constrained by the relevant intelligent
knowledge (as opposed to, for instance, prejudice, power, or politics).
Similarly, something is law (in the sense of intelligent knowledge) to
the extent that the intelligent knowledge is drawn from and reflective
of the relevant authoritative action (as opposed to, for instance, moral
judgments, political yearnings, or personal values).
This mutual self-constitution of the two senses of "law" cannot be
specified within the discipline. It cannot be specified because - from
Joseph Beale to Ronald Dworkin - the discipline of American law is
itself grounded on this circular ambiguity. The circular ambiguity of
law as authoritative action and law as intelligent knowledge is itself
introjected into the discipline of American law.
It is the presence of this ambiguity within the discipline of Ameri-
can law that enables legal thinkers to claim for themselves rather re-
markable powers to say what the law is: given enough will, it always
remains possible to affirm that intelligent knowledge governs authori-
tative action. Joseph Beale, for instance, was remarkably confident in
the power of legal academics to contribute to the formation of law:
127 There are many other constitutive ambiguities, but these are not of concern at this point.
See supra pp. 9o6-o8.
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The teachers of law today have an increasing influence, and one which is
comparable in degree with the part played by the judges, in the develop-
ment of the law; and their power to mould professional opinion is likely
to increase in the future more rapidly than that of the judges. 128
This confidence - born of Langdellian science - has remained. Like
Beale, Ronald Dworkin affirms a rather remarkable power of the legal
thinker to say what the law is. The introduction of one of his books
begins modestly enough: "We will study formal legal argument from
the judge's viewpoint . . . because judicial argument about claims of
law is a useful paradigm for exploring the central, propositional aspect
of legal practice .,129 By the end of the book, the law of the academy
has turned veritably into Law's Empire:
What is law? . . . Law's Empire is defined by attitude, not territory or
process. . . It is an interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to
politics in the broadest sense. Law's attitude is constructive: it aims to
lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better future,
keeping the right faith with the past.'3 0
In Law's Empire, law as authoritative action is profoundly - indeed,
amazingly - responsive to law as intelligent knowledge.
Although the circular ambiguity of law is introjected into the disci-
pline of law, it is obviously not introjected jot for jot. Still, certain
similarities are worth noting. The discipline of law does not merely
strive to study its objects (intelligent knowledge), but like law itself,
strives to regulate and to adjudicate their value and identities (authori-
tative action). Thus, the discipline of law, under various banners, as-
sumes for itself the status of the law of law. Whether as Langdellian
systematization, ALI Restatement, or legal theory, the discipline of
law desires to be the law of law. This is why legal scholarship is often
written in the idiom, aesthetic, and rhetoric of a legal brief. It is also
why legal thought sometimes sounds more like rulings from the bench
than like scholarly engagement.' 3 ' The introjection of the circular am-
biguity of law into the discipline also helps explain why elite and non-
elite members of the legal professoriate alike often assume a tone of
anguished solemnity and somber grandeur in expressing their legal
thought: they literally believe that they and their legal thought are re-
sponsible for the direction of the Court, the future of the rule of law,
even the welfare of the nation.
128 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 40 (1935).
129 Dwo1UUN, supra note 115, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 413.
131 Hence, for instance, when one commentator dismisses recent criticisms of rights, he sounds
eerily like a judge granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action: "[the attack
on rights] is based on confusion and on a failure to make necessary distinctions. The attack is
best aimed at particular rights, not at rights as such. In its usual form, it depends on a misunder-
standing of what rights are and of what they do." Cass P. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 729 (1995).
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The introjection of law's circular ambiguity into the discipline is in
a sense quite advantageous. Even as the discipline claims to be in-
volved in a rational or scholarly enterprise, it nonetheless can pattern
itself after the authoritative acts of state agents, such as courts and
legislatures. Insofar as the expressions of the state in the form of judi-
cial opinions, statutes, and regulations can be expected to endure, so
can the discipline that so helpfully organizes, rationalizes, and rep-
resents these expressions as intelligent knowledge. As long as the dis-
cipline shows obeisance to the authoritative legal forms, it enjoys the
backing of the state. This disciplinary advantage is a rather remarka-
ble one: the disciplinary knowledge of law can be true not because it
is true, but because the state makes it true.
The liberal state itself, with its commitments to reason, requires
something like this discipline not merely to function, but to constitute
itself as the liberal state. Insofar as the legitimacy of the actions of
state agents (judges, legislators, and the like) rests upon the claim that
these agents know what they are doing, there is a powerful incentive
to produce a legal knowledge, a form of knowing that is distinctly
legal. Not only must this "legal knowledge" be knowledge - exhibit
the aesthetic, the semblance of a discipline - but it also must be dis-
tinctly legal - capable of resisting or domesticating the knowledge
claims of other disciplines. Thus, whether or not a discipline of law is
possible or even coherent, the state demands its existence, its creation,
and its maintenance (even if only as an illusion). Law is the language
of the state, and the discipline is its keeper.
Thus, merely by subordinating intellectual endeavor to the idioms,
habits, concerns, anxieties, and cognitive orientations embodied in the
legal materials and legal institutions, American legal thinkers can
maintain their discipline. 132 It is, of course, an interesting question
what it is that is being maintained. To appreciate this point is to take
cognizance of a perverse possibility: given the circular ambiguity at
the heart of law, it is possible to arrive at a state of affairs in which
the intelligent knowledge of the discipline becomes subservient to the
authoritative action of law. In this condition, the intelligent knowl-
edge would serve primarily as a rationalization, a legitimation of au-
thoritative action. This, of course, is very close to the state of affairs
that phrenology reached toward its later stages: a state in which its
"intelligent knowledge" came to consist almost wholly of praise for its
own diagnostic and predictive powers.
Phrenology ultimately ran up against certain external barriers -
the brutal reality of physiological nature. In contrast, it is not alto-
gether clear what cold, hard realities can keep the development of law
or its discipline in check. Unlike phrenology, law and its discipline are
well positioned to proliferate - to assert their rule with ever more
132 For a description of the "unity of discourse" of legal scholars with judges, see Edward L.
Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MIC. L. REv. 1835, 1859-65 (1988).
1997]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
intensity in ever more precincts. And of course, given the circular am-
biguity, it is not at all clear what it is precisely that is being asserted
or who or what precisely is doing the asserting. These are questions
that the discipline of law, for understandable reasons, fails to pose, let
alone answer, in any intellectually serious way.
V. RECONSTRUCTION
The breakdown of Langdell's vision of law as science throughout
the twentieth century has occasioned many attempts to find or recon-
struct the intelligent knowledge of the law. In some cases, as in legal
realism, the attempt has been to find a better basis for the science.
Even today, one can still find the manifestations of a professional de-
sire to reinstitute the discipline of law as a science. Richard Posner,
for instance, once expressed this desire in his afterword to the inaugu-
ral issue of The Journal of Legal Studies:
The aim of the Journal is to encourage the application of scientific meth-
ods to the study of the legal system. As biology is to living organisms,
astronomy to the stars, or economics to the price system, so should legal
studies be to the legal system: an endeavor to make precise, objective,
and systematic observations of how the legal system operates in fact and
to discover and explain the recurrent patterns in the observations - the
"laws" of the system.133
The old dream dies hard. Although few legal thinkers today would
advertise their jurisprudence as "science," the desire for a systematic,
rigorous, demonstrable knowledge - the longing for a law of law -
remains.
One sees it still in the recent interdisciplinary movements. The ef-
forts of American legal thinkers to borrow from the most "rigorous" of
the social sciences and the humanities can be understood as an at-
tempt to repair and redeem the disintegrating disciplinary structure of
American law. By borrowing from microeconomics and analytical phi-
losophy, the most elite law schools attempt to "reconstruct" their disci-
plinary edifice, to "rethink" their disintegrating formalizations, and to
"restate" their claim of authority to say what the law is.
If these popular metaphors of "restatement," "rethinking," and "re-
construction" have any plausibility, it is because of a faith that some-
thing remains worth restating, rethinking, or reconstructing. But what
remains there is the pseudo-scientific Langdellian ontology. So even as
they "restate," "rethink," and "reconstruct," American legal thinkers do
so with and within the terms of the pseudo-scientific Langdellian on-
tology. American legal thinkers still use the units of analysis known as
doctrines, principles, policies, tests, and their aesthetic equivalents to
explain and justify other doctrines, principles, policies, tests, and their
133 Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies - An Afterword, i J.
LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1972).
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aesthetic equivalents. And they continue, despite what they say they
believe on this matter, to speak and write as if those are the precincts
where law is to be found.
The irony is that, from an intellectual standpoint, the Langdellian
ontology is pervasively flawed. The fundamental units of analysis, as
suggested earlier, are a locus of non-determination. This non-determi-
nation at the very foundation of law enabled both the rise and the
collapse of law as science. To the extent that this ontology remains the
groundwork after the fall, it also enables the emergence and destruc-
tion of every subsequent jurisprudence (even the most improbable). It
enables the rise of the new jurisprudences, because there is no onto-
logical ground to keep them out. And it enables their fall, because, in
their reductionist attempts to determine law to be this kind of thing
(as opposed to many other kinds of things), they are all utterly
improbable.
Perhaps we have now reached the point where this improbability is
self-evident. Consider, as an example, the vision of law as art, as liter-
ature.134 Now to be sure, one might find, here or there in the case
law, a well-composed opinion or a well-turned paragraph. But there is
nonetheless something deeply strained in a vision that would see
American law through the lens of art. It is hard to see just what kind
of aesthetic sensibility would allow the verbiage of the state codes, the
C.F.R., or Supreme Court opinions to be apprehended as an art form.
Qf course, it is not as if art cannot be found in American law. It can
- that is what non-determination implies. But to try to understand
American law as a kind of literature is a bit like trying to apprehend
Soviet Communism as a movement dedicated to sponsoring "socialist
realism."
Others think of American law as the realm of practical reason, of
phronesis, of pragmatism. 35 But in this vision too, something is fun-
damentally askew. Not only is there an inescapable emptiness to these
terms, 136 but despite their genial and accommodating emptiness, they
manage to remain dissonant with the character of American law. For
practical reason, phronesis, or pragmatism to be plausible, it would
seem necessary that they operate in a context in which such orienta-
tions could register their results. And that context is missing. Given
the massively overwrought and irrationally over-reasoned character of
American law at present, the most "reasonable" or "practical" thing to
do would be to not do it. If practical reason, phronesis, or pragma-
tism have anything to contribute to the enterprise of American law, it
is to counsel exit and abandonment.
134 See, e.g., WITE, supra note 123, at 77-IO6.
13S See generally Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (iggo) (discussing the role of pragmatism in law).
136 See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, ioo YALE L.J. 409, 410 (i99o).
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Still others think of law as an extension of moral philosophy. 137
This view also seems somewhat odd. After all, it is difficult to see
what kind of morality it is that would systematically overlook the
leveraging, the deception, the intimidation, the aggression, the harass-
ment, and the waste that comprise so much of the actual practice of
law.
Many others believe that law is (or ought to be) ruled by efficiency
considerations. In this belief too, there is something awry. In the face
of the extraordinary complexity of American law and its massive pil-
ing on of transaction costs, it is difficult to understand why anyone
would even dream that this massive bureaucratic maze was designed
to produce efficiency.
The interesting thing, then, about the various recent attempts to
recast American law in the image of literature, practical reason, philos-
ophy, or microeconomics, among others, is the stunning improbability
of such reconstructions. What all these reconstructions have in com-
mon is a strikingly implausible master claim - that law is a kind of
literature, that law is the forum of practical reason, that law is the
handmaiden of moral philosophy, or that law is efficiency in action. If
such improbable visions have taken root in the legal academy, it is
because the Langdellian paradigm has already done the groundwork.
The convergence of a vigorously self-referential disciplinary practice,
an instinct for the micro-context, a state-sponsored desire to legitimate
law, and a tracking of folk belief has eclipsed the raw improbability of
these visions and enabled them to thrive. Ironically, the very improb-
ability of these visions has made them all the more successful. Indeed,
it is precisely because law is so little like a work of literature, so per-
vasively unreasonable, so often morally obtuse, and so frequently inef-
ficient that there is so much for legal thinkers to say about how to
improve the law in accordance with these various visions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Now in one sense, a limited rhetorical sense, there is something to
admire here. American law is apparently one discipline that has been
able to sustain its intellectual credentials by representing itself in the
most extravagant and improbable ways. 138 In another sense, however,
perhaps we are to understand the increasing improbability of the erst-
while attempts to refurbish the intellectual image of law as a sign of
increasing desperation - as an indication that the discipline of Ameri-
can law has lost whatever intellectual bearings it may once have had.
Still, even as the new jurisprudential visions take hold, there is an
important sense in which the discipline of law remains eerily unmodi-
137 See, e.g., DwoRKiN, supra note II, at ix.
138 See STANLEY FISH, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THERE'S No SUCH
THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING Too 141, I56 (1994).
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fled - impervious to any and all "reconstructions." The intellectual
identity of the archetype may change, but the artifacts and the profes-
sional mission remain the same: sifting through the cases and other
legal artifacts, devising taxonomies, diagnosing pathologies, policing
the boundaries of law's empire, and turning anything and everything
into norm-forms. Even the most ambitious and subtle jurisprudential
projects seem to succumb to this politics of form. In the end, every
opinion tends to become, if not a law, at least a comprehensive juris-
prudence. Phrenology is dead. But law endures.
